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STUDY PROJECT

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TEAM YANKEE: A SCENARIO
WHOSE TIME HAS PASSED.

BY

COLONEL DANIEL E. BUTLER

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23 MARCH 1990



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) TEAM YANKEE: A SCENARIO WHOSE TIME HAS PASSED		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Individual Study
7. AUTHOR(s) Colonel Daniel E. Butler		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 23 March 1990
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 40
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION, DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The past year has been marked by revolutionary events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact has disintegrated as both a political and military alliance, and the Soviet Union is struggling to maintain the unity of its various Republics. The military threat to the nations of the NATO alliance has been drastically reduced, and a new status of world order is emerging. This study seeks to examine the forces that have brought about these changes in order to assist contemporary military officers in their efforts to respond to these changes. This paper will trace the shifts in Soviet military doctrine,		

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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TEAM YANKEE: A SCENARIO
WHOSE TIME HAS PASSED.

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
23 March 1990



Accession For	
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Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
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Distribution /	
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A-1	

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Daniel E. Butler. COL. INF.

TITLE: Team Yankee: A Scenario Whose Time Has Passed.

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 23 March 1990 Pages: 37 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The past year has been marked by revolutionary events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact has disintegrated as both a political and military alliance, and the Soviet Union is struggling to maintain the unity of its various Republics. The military threat to the nations of the NATO alliance has been drastically reduced, and a new status of world order is emerging. This study seeks to examine the forces that have brought about these changes in order to assist contemporary military officers in their efforts to respond to these changes. This paper will trace the shifts in Soviet military doctrine, discuss economic, social, political, and military changes inside the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact will also be addressed.

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TEAM YANKEE: A SCENARIO
WHOSE TIME HAS PASSED.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The two officers turned in the direction of the noise just in time to see two jets come screaming into the valley from the east, drop down lower, and fly up the valley on the right of the Team's positions. Bannon didn't recognize the aircraft type, aircraft recognition wasn't one of his strong points. But it wasn't necessary to identify the exact type. A glimpse of the red star on the fuselage told him everything that he needed to know about the two jets.

The waiting was over. The balloon had gone up. Team Yankee was at war.(1)

With the above words, Harold Coyle initiates the outbreak of hostilities between NATO and the nations of the Warsaw Pact in his best selling novel of the 1980's. His book, as did several other popular novels of the decade, doted on the concept of an armed clash between the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in central Europe. This, and similar scenarios, were the product of decades of tension between the nations of the Eastern and Western alliances, coupled with the offensive doctrines of the opposing groups.

The events of the past year have evidenced not a transition, but a revolution, in the relationships between the Soviet Union, the other nations of the Warsaw Pact, and the nations of the NATO alliance. The Soviet Union has

articulated an approaching era of great change. Indeed, great changes have occurred. In examining the changes, it is appropriate to start with the dramatic shift in Soviet military doctrine.

SOVIET DOCTRINE OF THE 1980'S

In the same manner that the universe is governed by physical laws, the Soviet's view war as being governed by objective laws. They have applied these laws to their own doctrine, as well as to the doctrine of their allies.(2) While the direction of Soviet force structure has often shifted in past years, the thrust of Soviet military thought in the decade of the 80's evidences the application of these laws.

Y.E. Savkin was at the forefront of Soviet military thought in the period that preceded the decade of the 1980's. In 1972, he codified key aspects of Soviet military thought in his work titled Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics. In stating the second law of war, Savkin wrote:

the course and outcome of war depends on the correlation of the military potentials of the combatants.(3)

Slightly different from the laws of war are the laws of armed combat. The second law of armed combat states:

any battle or operation at any given moment of its development takes shape in favor of the opposing side whose troops possess the greater combat power.(4)

Clearly, Soviet military doctrine did not regard parity as a desirable military concept. Soviet force structure was a product of this thought process.

This trend in Soviet military thought continued. By 1977, the definitions of the laws of war had evolved and were published in Volume 3 of Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya (regarded as an official source of information in the Soviet Union). The fifth law of war was given as:

the dependence on the course and outcome of war (is based) on the correlation of military forces (potentials) on the warring sides.(5)

During the transition into the 1980's, one concept remained constant. Correlation of forces was a keystone of Soviet operational and tactical doctrine.

Entrance into the 1980's was accompanied by an enhanced emphasis on maneuver brought on by the rise in the threat of tactical nuclear weapons.(6) Soviet assets and capabilities focused on the deep battle and the requirements to execute the concept of the Theater Strategic Operation (TSO). The Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) was the product of this concept of maneuver.(7) The deep attack dominated the

Soviet views of warfare. This emphasis was reflected in both operational and tactical manuals:

Offense is the principal form of battle.
It has decisive significance to victory over
the enemy.(8)

THE TRANSITION

A useful starting point in viewing the transition of Soviet doctrine and force structure rests with the policies of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. Three issues stand out. First, the Soviet Union focused on the design of a force structure that was to provide total assurance of victory in both conventional and nuclear scenarios. Second, the Soviets continued to dominate the military and political affairs of their Warsaw Pact allies. Third, active support was given to so-called "wars of national liberation." (9)

Since the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, these policies have seen significant modification. While opinions vary, two sets of circumstances seem to have been paramount in bringing about these changes.

First, the Soviet economy has evidenced great stagnation. GNP growth has declined, and there is a continued erosion of the industrial base. The development of technology lags behind other industrial countries. This causes great concern in the area of weapons technology.

Second, despite a massive effort the monolithic Soviet military has not prevailed quantitatively or qualitatively over the forces of the NATO alliance, has not been successful in defeating the Afghan resistance, and has not been able to intimidate the forces of change inside, or outside, of the Soviet Union.(10)

Rising to power in 1985, Gorbachev attempted to achieve unity, change, and cohesion by finesse rather than through the threat of force.(11) Generally, no significant concessions were made during this period, but a time of relaxation was evident. Signals were sent, and received, that perhaps a new era was at hand.

Following these initial efforts was a period characterized by relaxation and drift.(12) For the Soviet Union, 1987 and 1988 were marked by a mix of policy successes at home and abroad, balanced by a continued slacking of the Soviet economy. Ethnic issues aided in maintaining an inward focus and in enhancing a growing perception that perhaps the Soviet Union was adopting more relaxed approach to the affairs of the European continent.

A key transition in the Gorbachev era was ushered in with the December 1988 speech at the United Nations, in which General Secretary Gorbachev announced large unilateral military reductions along with other proposals affecting Soviet military, economic, and political policies.(13)

Key to the changes in military policy has been the discussion of a new standard of "sufficiency" for directing the size of Soviet force structure and a doctrine of "defensive defense" for military operations.(14) Both of these changes fly in the face of the laws of warfare that have marked the conduct of Soviet military affairs for past decades.

Gorbachev's efforts continue to be marked by change. The policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) are evolving. Clearly, there are forces underway that are not being directed according to plan.(15)

PURPOSE

The changes that have occurred in Europe are both real and significant. One can argue that they are irreversible during this decade. A response is required by the U. S. military that will include not only a redefinition of the role the Army will play in Europe, but a redefinition of the role it will play in the world and the shape it will take to perform this role.

The purpose of this paper is not to determine if "Team Yankee" is a relevant concept for the final decade of this century. The answer to that question is clear. Rather, this effort is designed to synthesize the changes that have brought an end to this concept in order to assist

contemporary military officers in their efforts to respond to these changes.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER 2

AN ERA OF CHANGE

The transition into the 1980's was greeted by rising tensions between the Soviet Union and the nations of the West. The Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 put an end to detente, and renewed the Cold War. Increasing friction between the East and the West gave rise to a series of novels depicting the advent of World War III. Tensions continued to grow through the middle of the decade. The prospect of a "Team Yankee" scenario unfolding in Central Europe was deemed a reality.

If there is a starting point in the period of change that has evidenced a reversal in the relationships between the Soviet Union and the nations of the West, it rests with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in 1985. His efforts have been driven by economic factors.

THE ECONOMY

In the latter half of the 1970s, the Soviet Union experienced a significant fall in economic performance. The early 1980's saw a continued decline in growth.(1) Subsequent years have seen further reductions with the

Soviet GNP growing at a rate of 2-3 per cent over the past years---well behind the nations of the Western bloc.(2)

Beginning about 1980, the economy became a matter of military concern. Soviet military writings began to suggest that advanced technologies held a greater potential for enhancing military capabilities than did increased force levels.(3) These writings also suggested that the Soviet industrial base could not adequately support the technology required in future years.

Gorbachev's effort at restructuring the Soviet economy is an attempt to overcome the inherent inefficiencies of the centralized Soviet system. His early attempts met with no success, and were marked by rising consumer dissatisfaction. Along with other institutions, he has looked to the previously sheltered defense sector as a means of achieving some economic gains.(4)

Latest estimates indicate that the Soviet Union was spending 15-17 per cent of its GNP on defense during the mid-1980s, and that this figure has risen under Gorbachev.(5) This is roughly three times in proportion to GNP what the United States spends on defense.(6) In fact, the figure may be higher. In either case, Soviet participation in the arms race has had a serious and detrimental impact on the Soviet economy.

In an effort to focus on long term economic growth, the Soviets are apparently shifting some emphasis away from the

military to the civilian sector. In January 1989, Gorbachev declared that the defense budget would be cut by 14 per cent and the production of military equipment by 19 per cent.(7) Indications are that production of military equipment has slowed.

DEMOGRAPHICS

Clearly, a vast human resource pool is required to field a military force numbering over five million men. Demographic trends clearly indicate that the Slavic European republics are experiencing reduced birth rates, while the Muslim regions are experiencing very high birth rates.(8) This trend in the change of the Soviet population has an obvious impact on both the civilian and military sectors. Non-Slavic conscripts now make up 37 per cent of the total draft intake, compared to 28 per cent in 1980.(9) Their lack of technical skills, overall lower education levels, and poor Russian language skills pose great problems for effective military training. The 500,000 man cut announced in December 1988 will, over the long term, have no impact in reducing the reliance on non-Slavic minorities.

A 500,000 man reduction is also expected to eliminate 100,000 officers, many of whom possess technical skills required by the civilian sector. Additionally, the Soviets

reinstated university deferments in March 1989---a move they said was made possible by the announced troop cuts.(10)

The recent rash of ethnic unrest in the Southern and Asian republics is having an obvious impact on the cohesion of the Soviet military. Already beset with a growing morale problem, the Soviet military is having to question the loyalty of an increasing segment of its ranks.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE

The Soviet government is clearly demonstrating a greater tolerance for political and social diversity.(11) The policy of glasnost (openness) has resulted in open and widespread dissension and has diverted the Soviet Union's attention inward despite revolutionary changes taking place in Eastern Europe.(12) The political revolution that has swept Eastern Europe, linked with the impact of glasnost internally, has opened up a "Pandora's Box" of nationalism.

The political challenges of the Baltic Republics and the ethnic rioting and challenges posed by the southern republics all serve to create discord among the ranks of the Soviet Army.(13) To a degree growing weekly, the Soviet military is being placed in the position of having to suppress political and ethnic turmoil. It is a role it does not cherish.

During recent ethnic unrest, officers and conscripts were reported to have gone AWOL to join in the fighting that raged between Azerbaijanis and Armenians.(14) This clearly runs counter to the popularized image of the Soviet military being the great internationalizer of the Soviet Union. More and more, reports are surfacing regarding serious crimes surrounding inter-ethnic hazing in the military.(15)

Relegated to unpopular roles, plagued by a rash of public criticism, and watching its position in Soviet society diminish daily, military prestige and influence are at their lowest in decades.(16)

SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS

During his speech at the United Nations in December 1988, Gorbachev announced major unilateral force cuts. Gorbachev announced the cut of 500,000 personnel, to include 100,000 officers, from the armed forces. Of greatest significance, 50,000 of these cuts would come from units stationed in Eastern Europe, and 190,000 from units stationed in the European portion of the Soviet Union.(17)

Included in the forces to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe were six tank divisions as well as air assault and bridging units. Four of the divisions were to be withdrawn from East Germany, and one each from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. After withdrawal, these units were to be

disbanded. Remaining forces in Eastern Europe were to be "defensively" configured.(18)

In subsequent announcements, Gorbachev stated that 12 divisions and 11 aviation regiments in the Far East would be eliminated. Minister of Defense Yazov also stated that some motorized rifle divisions in the eastern and southern portions of the Soviet Union would be converted to machine gun and artillery units structured for static defense. He also stated that future changes would reduce the number of combined arms divisions by half.(19)

In conjunction with personnel cuts, 10,000 tanks were to be eliminated, with 5,300 coming from Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. These tanks were to be destroyed or converted to civilian use.(20) Eight hundred aircraft were to be removed from Eastern Europe and the Western portion of the Soviet Union and destroyed. Additionally, 8,500 artillery systems and the short range nuclear systems (FROG or SS-21 missiles) associated with the six withdrawing tank divisions are to be eliminated.(21)

Time and circumstances have overcome these force reduction statements. While data from the summer of 1988 indicated that the Soviets were at approximately the half-way point in their withdrawal (22), recent agreements have seen the Soviets agreeing to President Bush's proposal to limit forces in central Europe to 195,000.(23) This amounts to a withdrawal of over 440,000 Soviet troops

in Eastern Europe.(24) U.S. troop withdrawals amount to approximately 120,000.(25)

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CHAPTER III

THE WARSAW PACT

The end of World War II did not evidence the end of hostilities in Europe. The friction that had marked the relationships between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies during the campaigns against Nazi Germany erupted into the "Cold War", and gave rise to the formation of the NATO Alliance and the subsequent evolution of the Warsaw Pact.

Established in 1955, the Warsaw Pact did not result from the establishment of the NATO Alliance, but was the final reaction to past friction culminating with the rearming of Germany. Since the creation of the alliance, the Soviet Union has dominated the affairs of its member states. This overt dominance has created and sustained considerable friction among the member nations. The massive turbulence of the past years, in many ways, a manifestation of this sustained friction.

FORMATION OF THE WARSAW PACT

As the Allied armies occupied Europe at the end of World War II, it was the Western nations that established the first unified political/military alliance that was to dominate the affairs of Western Europe for the next forty-five years. The decision of the Alliance to rearm West Germany as a full member of NATO was the trigger that brought about the formation of the Warsaw Pact. Preceding the formal creation of the Pact, the Soviet Union had signed a series of bilateral treaties with the nations of Eastern Europe. By 1949, every nation of Eastern Europe, except occupied East Germany, had entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union.(1)

The formal charter for the Warsaw Pact was established on 14 May 1955. Countries signing the agreement were the Soviet Union, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the relatively new state, the German Democratic Republic. Prior to the treaty agreement, Soviet advisors were present in each of the military units of the signing nations down to regimental level. A pure Soviet air defense network was integrated into the territories of Eastern Europe. The heavy hand of the Soviet Union was present in the affairs of the signing states well before the official agreement was signed.(2)

From the Soviet viewpoint, the reasons behind the treaty were both military and political in their focus. Militarily, the treaty provided the basis for a collective security agreement, and was a counter to the rearming of West Germany. Politically, it provided the basis for future negotiations between "equals", justified the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, and provided a replacement for Stalin's personalized style of rule.(3) For over forty years, this rationale was to provide the basis for the stand-off between the NATO Alliance and the nations of the Warsaw Pact.

Even prior to its creation, the organization that was to become the Warsaw Pact was marked by tensions derived from the dominance of the Soviet Union. This dominance has continued through the years unmatched in the relationships among the nations of the NATO Alliance.(4) Time and rhetoric has not changed this fact. History did not support Gorbachev's statements of 1985 when he said:

History has not known an alliance such as ours, in which relations are based on the principles of full equality and the friendly mutual help of sovereign nations.(5)

From its inception, the Warsaw Pact has been a counter not only to the presence of NATO, but to overt dissent among its member nations. The Hungarian crisis in 1956 provided the first major test of the role the Soviet Union was willing to play in the affairs of its neighboring allies.

In 1968, the "Action Program" of Alexander Dubcek's new government in Czechoslovakia created a second crisis. In August, over 650,000 Soviet, Polish, German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops were employed to suppress the liberal programs of the new government and remove its leadership.(6)

This history of Soviet dominance has continued in the years since these early conflicts. Despite the Pact taking on a global, vice a European, focus in the 1970's, the states of the Warsaw Pact Alliance were not consulted prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.(7)

Major force posturing of the Warsaw Pact was undertaken during the 1980-81 Polish crisis. While no overt invasion took place, the threat of military force was clearly demonstrated. The marshal law imposed by the ruling communist government was not only supported, but demanded, by Moscow. It was not coincidence that the second "Druzhiba" Exercise was subsequently conducted in Poland during March of 1982.(8)

In response to the US deployment of GLCM and Pershing II missiles in 1982, the Soviets deployed SS-21 and SS-23 missiles to East Germany and Czechoslovakia. In both cases, neither country was consulted in advance of this decision. Both nations subsequently expressed considerable displeasure with the deployment of these systems.(9)

THE GORBACHEV YEARS

Mikhail Gorbachev came to power with a history of Soviet dominance in the political and military of the nations of Eastern Europe functioning as it had in past years. Under his leadership, the nations of the Warsaw Pact have seen an evolving attitude on the part of the Soviet Union that has resulted in significant changes.

While no major policy changes were evident in the initial period of Gorbachev's direction, a time of relaxation was evident. In September 1986, the Stockholm Accord on Confidence-Building Measures was signed. Article 15 of this agreement renounced the use of force within, and between, alliances:

[The signatories] will abide by their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with any state, regardless of that state's political, social, economic, or cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with that state relations of alliance.(10)

Clearly, signals were sent, and received, that perhaps a new era was at hand.

Following the signing of the Stockholm Accord was a period characterized by relaxation and drift.(11) For the Soviet Union, foreign policy successes were balanced by a continued slacking of the Soviet economy, and a surge of ethnic unrest. Internal issues kept Soviet attention inward

and off the affairs of Eastern Europe.

On November 2, 1987, Gorbachev made a major policy speech in which he highlighted the six principles on which "the practice of Socialist Internationalism rests." They were: unconditional and total equality of the member states; responsibility of each ruling party for the affairs of its own state; concern for the general cause of socialism; respect for every other member; voluntary and diverse cooperation; and strict observation of the principles of peaceful coexistence.(12) This key policy speech reinforced the perception that a new social and political order was evolving in Eastern Europe.

A significant transition in the Gorbachev era was ushered in with his December 1988 speech at the United Nations. Major unilateral force reductions were announced. Subsequently, five of the six Warsaw Pact allies have announced their own packages of force cuts:(13)

-East Germany. 10,000 personnel, six tank regiments containing 600 tanks, and an air force wing of 50 aircraft.(14)

-Poland. Deactivation of four divisions, two divisions reduced to cadre strength, deactivation of ten to twenty armored regiments, and consolidation of air force and air defense forces. Cuts equate to 40,000 troops, 850 tanks, 900 guns, and 80 aircraft.(15)

-Czechoslovakia. Combat forces will be reduced by 12,000 through the deactivation of three divisions and an unspecified number of tank regiments and air force regiments. Cuts include 850 tanks, 165 armored vehicles, and 51 aircraft.(16)

-Hungary. Elimination of one tank regiment, one fighter squadron, and 251 tanks, 30 armored vehicles, 430 artillery pieces, and 9,300 personnel.(17)

-Bulgaria. Elimination of 10,000 personnel, 200 tanks, 200 artillery systems, 20 aircraft, and five ships.(18)

These force reductions have progressed since their announcement. Estimates of progress as of January 1990 are in the 50 per cent range.

The impact of these force reductions is amplified by the political changes that have swept Eastern Europe during the past year. Politically, the end result has been the transition of communist governments in all nations of the Warsaw Pact except the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, the government has proposed the removal of the communist party's monopoly on power from the constitution and has proposed free elections in June. The Soviet Union has initiated similar proposals. Clearly, the politics of the Warsaw Pact nations will never be the same.

AREAS OF CONTENTION

One of the manifestations of the political shifts in Eastern Europe has been the rise in nationalism among the member states. The governments of each country containing Soviet garrisons have established withdrawal deadlines for Soviet forces or are negotiating these dates. This will require the move of over 550,000 troops back to the Soviet Union.(19)

While these demands have been made, and acknowledged by the Soviet Union, they provide an interesting contrast with agreements made between the Soviet Union and the United States at the Ottawa Conference in February 1990. Agreements were reached that established troop ceilings for both nations at 195,000 in the "central zone" with the United States allowed an additional 30,000 forces outside of this area.(20) While these sets of agreements are not in conflict due to the ceiling aspects of the Ottawa agreements, it is interesting to note that bilateral political concessions are running ahead of arms negotiations.

Following meetings between West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet leader Gorbachev, the Soviets issued statements agreeing to the unification of Germany.(21) However, no agreement was reached on the withdrawal of

Soviet forces from East Germany because of the presence of U.S. forces in West Germany.

In summary, multiple negotiations are underway regarding the forces of the Warsaw Pact---including those of the Soviet Union. While they are not clearly aligned, one fact remains clear. A major reduction of Warsaw Pact forces is underway, and the bulk, if not all, of Soviet forces garrisoned in Eastern Europe will be withdrawn. The only real issue is the time frame in which this will happen.

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CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

The entrance into the decade of the 1990's evidences a sharp contrast from the entrance into the decade of the 1980's. The tensions that marked the first transition appear to have been replaced by optimism in both the Eastern and the Western blocs for reduced friction in an era of revolutionary change.

THE SOVIET UNION

The driver for change has clearly been the economy. The sagging productivity of the Soviet state was the basis for Gorbachev's perestroika (restructuring). His far ranging attempts to overcome the inherent inefficiencies of the centralized economic system have had an impact on all factors of the Soviet society. (1) Gorbachev's attempt to build the political power base necessary to effect his economic reforms gave rise to the policies of glasnost (openness).(2) The forces for change have been unleashed, but the prospects for change in the economy are open to debate.

Linked with the tide of change that has swept over the other states of Eastern Europe, glasnost has produced its own responses inside the Soviet Union. National and ethnic frustrations have boiled over and given rise to massive political dissent, ethnic rioting, and a national outcry over the quality of life in the Soviet Union. Pandora's Box has been opened and probably cannot be closed.

Demographics play an obvious role in the unrest that is sweeping the Soviet Union. What have been the minorities in the Soviet Union are progressing toward becoming the majority of the nation's people. Their demands for increased recognition have been one of the key issues in the inward view taken by the communist party over the past few years leading into the new decade. Potentially, ethnic and regional unrest may surpass the economy as the driver in the future of the Soviet Union. Unless economic and social demands are met, the Soviet Union may have problems in maintaining its union.(3)

The significance of the cuts in the military force structure are debatable. One side pushes the concept that reduction is nothing but a means to modernize the Soviet military through streamlining its force structure---create the "lean and mean" force required for the coming years.(4) Others push the notion that the reductions are recognition of the changes in political climate and the imperatives brought on by the economic problems that plague the society.

Whatever the real reason, the Soviet military is undergoing significant change.(5)

A reduction in the size and composition of conventional forces may have more than one meaning. Reductions are being paralleled with a significant modernization effort. Linked with an enhanced command and control capability, these changes could field a more offensively capable force.(6) It is too early in the process of arms negotiations and force reductions to determine the effect of the ongoing changes. Clearly, caution is recommended.

On a more obvious note, technology is presently working against the Soviets.(7) Their history of matching quantity of numbers against the Western approach of quality of technology is causing great concern in the ranks of their military. Their own concepts of the laws that govern warfare are working against them. The implication of technology on the correlation of forces, linked with an industrial system that is working at a deficit when compared with that of the West, paints a grim picture for the future.

From their own press, and from that of West, morale is a pressing problem for the Soviet military.(8) The military is clearly playing a bill-payer role for the economy, is involved more and more in an internal peace keeping role against its own people, and is suffering a tirade of criticism from its own nation.(9) Historically, the symbol

of the nation's salvation. It is becoming a target of its frustration.

EASTERN EUROPE

Political change has swept Eastern Europe. The communist party is struggling to survive in the nations that have been the Warsaw Pact and rising nationalism is destroying what was a major military threat to the nations of the NATO alliance. While the military cohesion of the Warsaw Pact is at best questionable, the political reliability of the nations that form the alliance is in greater doubt.(10)

Every nation in Eastern Europe is effecting major cuts in their military force structure. At the same time, each of the nations that house Soviet garrisons have requested, insisted, or scheduled the withdrawal of these units.(11)

German reunification is an accepted fact of the near future. While serving as the great catalyst of several issues, it ultimately will serve to separate the opposing teams of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is unthinkable that Soviet and U.S. military forces will continue for any extended period to face each other in a unified Germany.

THE WEST

Conditions in the West are favorable in light of the changes that are sweeping the East. The growing economic posture of Western Europe, linked with the perception of a greatly reduced threat from the Soviet Union, is fostering and supporting the changes in the nations to the East. The idea of a unified and greater Europe is appealing to a generation that has not experienced the war their parents knew.

The same economic pressures that are driving the Soviet Union are being felt in the United States. Budget deficits are felt at local and state communities, as well as at the national level. The defense community is being targeted as a bill payer in the age of a retreating threat. Force reductions are a reality for the U.S. military. The boys are coming home. The only question is how soon.

TEAM YANKEE

Team Yankee was the scenario for the 80's. A decade passed with the armed forces of the Eastern and Western powers poised at the ready. The potential for armed conflict was more than possible. Times have changed.

Times are chaotic. Clearly times are unstable---and perhaps unpredictable. But, they are not as dangerous as in the past.

The senior leaders of the United States military have commented on the status of the world in recent days:

Gen. John Galvin. "It would be very difficult for the Soviet military to pull together to do anything militarily."(12)

Admiral Huntington Hardisty. "For the first time in decades we see more opportunities in the world than threats."(13)

It is a time of revolutionary change. It is also a time of great uncertainty. But it is not the time for "Team Yankee" to unfold. Harold Coyle's book was produced by the times--and those times are no longer relevant. "Team Yankee" was a fictional, though highly possible, scenario for the decade of the 80's, that appears to have lost its relevance as we enter the decade of the 90's.

The Army's response to this change must be based on an understanding of the forces that have driven the change. Problem solution should be based on problem definition. Problem definition clearly includes an understanding of the forces that have driven this change within the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

ENDNOTES

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2. Ibid. p. 10.
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5. Soviet Military Power, pp. 102-103.
6. Goure. p. 43.
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9. Peter Gumbel, "Red Army Bangs Drum Over Violence", Wall Street Journal, 19 January 1990, p. A6.
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